Published Papers:

Evidence and Skepticism in Verifiable Disclosure Games  (Theoretical Economics, 2025)
My earlier working paper
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Beyond Unbounded Beliefs: How Preferences and Information Interplay in Social Learning, with Navin Kartik, SangMok Lee, and Tianhao Liu (Econometrica, 2024)
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Single-Crossing Differences In Convex Environments, with Navin Kartik and SangMok Lee (Review of Economic Studies, 2024)
Our earlier working paper
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Addressing Strategic Uncertainty with Incentives and Information, with Marina Halac and Elliot Lipnowski  (AEA Papers and Proceedings, 2022)
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Rank Uncertainty in Organizations, with Marina Halac and Elliot Lipnowski  (American Economic Review, 2021)
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Working Papers:​

Signaling by Taking Stands, with Andrew McClellan (Revised January 2026) (R&R, Journal of Political Economy)
Our earlier working paper which expands on investigation design

Pricing for Coordination, with Marina Halac and Elliot Lipnowski (Revised January 2026) (R&R, American Economic Review)
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Reputational Delegation (Revised March 2026)
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Incentivizing Information Design, with ​Valentin Somma (Revised July 2017)

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Work in Progress:
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Signaling with Plausible Deniability, with Andrew McClellan